Senate Floor Statement of Senator Lugar Lugar Floor Statement on U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement Wednesday, October 1, 2008 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican leader Dick Lugar made the following statement on the floor of the Senate today at the beginning of the debate on the U.S.-India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement:   Mr. President, today the Senate considers the U.S.-India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This is one of the most important strategic diplomatic initiatives undertaken in the last decade. By concluding this pact, the U.S. has embraced a long-term outlook that will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability.   This legislation approving the 123 agreement will allow the United States to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, while protecting U.S. national security and nonproliferation efforts, as well as congressional prerogatives. It is an opportunity to build a strategic partnership with a nation that shares our democratic values and will exert increasing influence on the world stage.   Last Saturday, September 27th, the House of Representatives voted 297 - 117 to approve the agreement. Senate approval would be the capstone to more than three years of effort in the United States, in India, and around the world.   By embracing this agreement, India’s leaders are seeking to open a new chapter in U.S-India relations and reverse decades of fundamental disagreement over the nonproliferation regime.   India has created a new national export control system; promised to maintain its unilateral nuclear testing moratorium; pledged to work with us to stop the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies; proposed to separate its civilian and military facilities, and committed to place its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.   If approved, this agreement will allow India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors from the United States - benefits that were previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The benefits of this pact are designed to be a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation.   The 123 agreement was submitted by President Bush on September 10, 2008. Last week, the Foreign Relations Committee voted 19-2 to report the bill approving the agreement to the full Senate. The bill the House voted on Saturday is almost identical to the bill approved by the Foreign Relations Committee.   Two years ago, the Senate voted 85 - 12 to approve legislation that set the parameters for the 123 agreement we consider today. The House voted 359 - 68 to approve companion legislation. At the time, the Foreign Relations Committee undertook an extensive review of the agreement and its context. We held three public hearings with testimony from 17 witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a classified briefing from then Under Secretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council. I submitted 174 written questions for the record to the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the answers on my website (at http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/Lugar_India_Responses.pdf).   The 2006 legislation set the rules for today’s consideration of the 123 agreement between the United States and India. Unlike the Administration’s original proposal, the Hyde Act neither restricted, nor predetermined congressional action on the 123 agreement.   We expected India to move quickly to negotiate a new safeguards agreement with the IAEA and then to seek consensus from the Nuclear Suppliers Group in accordance with the Hyde Act. Unfortunately, domestic political divisions in India led to a delay of nearly two years. Final action on these two tasks was not completed until earlier this month. India engaged and obtained the approval of a new safeguards agreement with the IAEA on August 1. NSG consensus was achieved on September 6. Since that time, the Administration and both Houses of Congress have worked diligently to evaluate the agreement, answer questions from members, and move the process forward.   The Hyde Act required the President to report to Congress on whether India had met seven determinations, which are as follows:   ·        India has provided the U.S. and the IAEA with a separation plan for its civilian and military facilities and filed a declaration regarding civilian facilities with the IAEA; ·        India has concluded all legal steps prior to signature for a safeguards agreement in perpetuity with the IAEA; ·        India and the IAEA are making substantial progress in completing an Additional Protocol; ·        India is working actively with the United States to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty; ·        India is working with and supporting the United States to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology; ·        India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear materials and technology; and, ·        The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items under an exception to their guidelines.   Two weeks ago at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns, Acting Under Secretary John Rood, and the lead U.S. negotiator, Richard Stratford, provided detailed analysis of the agreement. Members were able to examine the documents accompanying the 123 agreement and ask questions of the witnesses about the Hyde Act, the 123 agreement’s text, the new safeguards agreement, and the NSG decision.   I am convinced that the President has met all of the required determinations under the Hyde Act. However, the Congressional review of the agreement demonstrated that two issues required provisions in the legislation before us.   First, India has not identified in the text of its IAEA safeguards agreement those facilities that it will place under safeguards. India has provided a plan for the separation of facilities from its nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, but the plan is nonbinding and appears outdated.   This is not what Congress understood would happen when we approved the Hyde Act. Indeed, in 2006, the Administration requested bill language calling on India to file "a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA." The safeguards agreement containing that declaration was to enter into force before submission of the 123 Agreement to Congress.   Under the Hyde Act, India and the IAEA must conclude "all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices ... to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs ... including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities."   The purpose of this complex provision was to secure the most complete version possible of the safeguards agreement for congressional review. We intended that it be submitted as part of the Presidential determination and waiver report required by the Hyde Act. Unfortunately, by not naming the facilities in the safeguards agreement, there is an open question as to when India will act. This has legal implications because the United States is prohibited by law and our NPT obligations from having nuclear trade with any facility not named in India’s safeguards agreement.   In response to this issue, Section 104 of the bill before us requires that licenses may not be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transfers of nuclear fuel, equipment and technology until after the President determines and certifies to Congress that (1) the safeguards agreement approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on August 1, 2008, has entered into force; and (2) India has filed a declaration of facilities that is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule described in its separation plan.   The second issue that required a new provision in this legislation is India’s desire to reprocess spent nuclear fuel burned in its reactors, including fuel from the United States. Reprocessing can result in the separation of plutonium, which can be used in a nuclear weapon. The United States permits some NPT members with long histories of strong compliance with IAEA agreements to reprocess U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel through a process called "Programmatic Consent."   During negotiations on the 123 Agreement, India requested Programmatic Consent and the United States agreed. However, the United States made Programmatic Consent contingent on India establishing a dedicated facility to carry out the reprocessing and an agreement on reprocessing procedures in this new facility.   During our hearing, I asked Acting Under Secretary John Rood if the arrangements that would be negotiated with India to permit reprocessing would be submitted to Congress for review. Mr. Rood stated "... yes, that's required under the Atomic Energy Act."   Mr. President, permitting spent nuclear fuel from the United States to be reprocessed in India is a complex matter that requires careful implementation. The bill before us today does not block negotiations on such arrangements with India. However, the bill does require a future Administration to submit such a "subsequent arrangement" to Congress, which would have the power to pass a resolution of disapproval.   By addressing these two important matters, I believe this legislation improves Congressional oversight for future nuclear cooperation with India and corrects a problem related to the new safeguards agreement India has with the IAEA.   In conclusion, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to approve the U.S.-India agreement. The national security and economic future of the United States would be enhanced by a strong and enduring partnership with India. With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth.   Moreover, the United States has an interest in expanding energy cooperation with India to develop new technologies, cut green house gas emissions, and prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves. The United States’ own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do not forge energy partnerships with India, China, and other nations experiencing rapid economic growth.   This legislation will promote much closer U.S.-Indian relations, while preserving the priority of our nonproliferation efforts. We should move forward now.   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.   ###