Senate Floor Statement of Senator Lugar Lugar introduces bill to assure arms control inspections continue until new START Treaty ratified Thursday, November 5, 2009 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Dick Lugar will deliver the following remarks on the Senate Floor at 11 a.m. today:   Mr. President, I rise to speak on S. 2727, the “START I Treaty Inspections and Monitoring Protocol Continuation Act of 2009,” which I introduced yesterday.  This bill provides authority that would allow the President of the United States to extend, on a reciprocal basis, privileges and immunities to Russian arms inspection teams that may come to the United States to carry out inspections permitted under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START I.    This bill is necessary, because on December 5, one month from today, the START I Treaty will expire.  This Treaty, signed in 1991, is obscure to many in the Senate.  Only 26 current Senators were serving at the time we voted on the Resolution of Ratification in October 1992.  But the START I Treaty has been vitally important to arms control efforts up to the present day, because it contains a comprehensive verification regime that undergirds every existing U.S.-Russian treaty that deals with strategic arms control.   It is essential to understand that a successful arms control regime depends on much more than mutual agreement on the numbers of weapons to be eliminated.  Arms control agreements also must provide for verification measures, including seemingly mundane details such as delineating the privileges and responsibilities of verification teams operating in each other’s countries, as well as the procedures for conducting inspections.  These details require legal authorization that minimizes disputes and reinforces reciprocal expectations of how the verification regime will function.  If the legal authorization for strategic arms control verification lapses, as it will in one month, we will be creating unnecessary risks for U.S. national security and our working relationship with Russia.   It had been my hope that the previous and current Administrations would have made substantially more progress on ensuring the continuity of the START I verification system so that the legal authorities I am proposing today would not be necessary.  But we have reached the point where both the United States and Russia must take steps to ensure the continuity of verification mechanisms.    History of the Verification Gap   In 2002, the Senate considered the Moscow Treaty governing strategic nuclear forces.  That treaty contained no verification mechanisms.  Instead it relied on the verification regime established in the START I Treaty.  During Senate consideration of the Moscow Treaty, I asked Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about the apparent gap in verification that could occur given that the Moscow Treaty extends to 2012, while the START I verification provisions were set to expire on December 5, 2009.    Secretary Powell stated that “it did not seem to be something that was pressing at the moment.”   He said that during negotiations on the Moscow Treaty, consideration was given to extending the START verification regime past 2009, in a separate negotiation, or that the transparency measures under the Moscow Treaty could be maximized in some way to provide for enhanced verification.  But, Secretary Powell said in 2002 that we had “some 7 years to find an answer to that question.”    Likewise, Secretary Rumsfeld was questioned about the verification gap created by the 2009 expiration of START.  He stated:   “There is [a gap], from 2009 to 2012, exactly. But between now and 2009… there is plenty of time to sort through what we will do thereafter….Will we be able to do something that is better than the START treaty? I hope so. Do we have a number of years that we can work on that? Yes.”      I was pleased to play a role in securing ratification of the Moscow Treaty on March 6, 2003.  But, at that time, Senators were led to understand that the Bush Administration would begin work with Russia on codifying a verification regime under the Moscow Treaty, either by continuing the START verification regime past 2009 or through other measures.  Neither was accomplished.    The START Treaty itself provides that the parties must meet to extend the Treaty “no later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period” of its duration.  In 2008, we witnessed the conflict in Georgia.  December 5, 2008, was the date by which the United States and Russia would have to meet to satisfy the Treaty’s requirement.  Many worried that the atmosphere created by the Georgia situation would prevent the United States and Russia from conducting such a meeting.  But, to the Bush Administration’s credit, a meeting was held that provided us the possibility of extending the treaty.      But the clock kept ticking.   I noted during Secretary Clinton’s confirmation hearings on January 13, 2009, that it was vital that the START Treaty be renewed.  At that time she assured the Committee that “we will have a very strong commitment to the START Treaty negotiation.”  I don’t doubt that commitment.  I am hopeful that the capable negotiators we have deployed to Geneva will achieve a new treaty in the remaining 30 days before expiration.  But even if that happens, the time required for a thorough Senate consideration of the Treaty ensures that it will not be ratified before START I expires.      The START Verification Regime   At the core of the START Treaty rests its verification regime—a system of data exchanges and more than eighty different types of notifications covering movement, changes in status, conversion, elimination, testing and technical characteristics of new and existing strategic offensive arms.  This data is further verified through an inspection regime.  The START Treaty Inspection Protocol permits no less than twelve different types of inspections pursuant to the Treaty.    According to a fact sheet released by the Department of State in July 2009, the United States has conducted more than 600 START inspections in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.  Russia has conducted more than 400 inspections in the United States.  These intrusive, on-site inspections permit the United States to verify the kinds and types of Russian weapons being deployed, as well as to examine modified versions of Russia’s weapons.  It is this ability, in addition to our own national technical means, that gives us the capabilities and confidence to ensure effective verification of the Treaty.   Some skeptics have pointed out that Russia may not be in total compliance with its obligations under START.  Others have expressed opposition to the START Treaty on the basis that no arms control agreement is 100-percent verifiable.  But such concerns fail to appreciate how much information is provided through the exchange of data mandated by the Treaty, on-site inspections, and national technical means.  Our experiences over many years have proven the effectiveness of the Treaty’s verification provisions and served to build a basis for confidence between the two countries when doubts arose.  The bottom line is that the United States is far safer as a result of those 600 START inspections than we would be without them.   Testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee on the INF Treaty in 1988, Paul Nitze provided the definition of “effective verification.”  He stated:   “What do we mean by effective verification?  We mean that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.”                     In a similar vein, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates testified in 1992, when he was Director of Central Intelligence, that the START Treaty was effectively verifiable and that the data it provides would give us the ability to detect militarily-significant cheating.               The Senate has repeatedly expressed confidence in the START I verification procedures.   It approved the START I Treaty in 1992, by a vote of 93-6.  In 1996, it approved the START II Treaty, which relied on the START I verification regime, by a vote of 87-4.  Likewise, the Moscow Treaty was approved by a vote of 95-0.    Maintaining Verification Continuity               The current Administration has deployed a capable team to Geneva.    Just last week, National Security Advisor Jim Jones went to Moscow to underscore the importance of achieving agreement on a successor to the START Treaty.  The Administration has publicly stated that it seeks a new treaty that will “combine the predictability of START with the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty, but at lower numbers of delivery vehicles and their associated warheads.”  This predictability stems directly from START’s verifiability.       So far, most of the public discussion surrounding a potential successor agreement has focused on further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.  Scant attention has been paid to the verification arrangements for such a follow-on agreement.  Informally, we understand that we will yet again be relying on START’s verification regime in the new agreement.  For me, this will be the key determinant in assessing whether a follow-on agreement that comes before the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate furthers the national interest.  For the moment, we know only the outlines of such an agreement.  What is certain is that after December 5th no legally-binding treaty will exist that provides for on-site arms inspections.      My bill is not a substitute for a treaty. But without it, it is unclear how we can permit, and by extension carry out, any inspection activities.  This might not appear troubling to some.  But allowing a break in verification activities is not in the interest of the United States or Russia.  Such a break could amplify suspicions or even complicate the conclusion of the START successor agreement.    I believe it is incumbent upon the United States and Russia to maintain mutual confidence and preserve a proven verification regime between December 5 and the entry into force of a new agreement.  If we are to do so, the legal tools that are contained in the bill that I have introduced are essential.  There is nothing in my bill that requires the Administration to admit Russian inspection teams in the absence of reciprocity by Moscow.  Nor does the bill expand verification activities beyond those already conducted under the START protocol. The authorities in the bill would terminate on June 5, 2010, or on the date of the entry into force of a successor agreement to the START Treaty.   We must ensure that needed verification tools will exist in the period between START’s expiration and entry into force of a new treaty.  I am hopeful that the Congress will take action on S. 2727 in the near future, and that both the Obama Administration and the Russian government take steps to maintain inspections until ratification of a START successor agreement is completed.   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.                                                    # # #