Committee Statement of Senator Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on the New START Treaty Thursday, April 29, 2010 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Dick Lugar made the following statement at today’s hearing.   Today the Committee meets to hear testimony regarding the new START Treaty and the historical context of U.S.-Russian arms control. I join the Chairman in welcoming two good friends to the Committee, Jim Schlesinger and Bill Perry. They led the commission that wrote the important “Report on America’s Strategic Posture” that was mandated by Congress and released in 2009. We look forward both to their insights from this report and their personal observations based on decades of arms control and defense policy leadership.   Earlier this month, in Prague, the United States and Russia signed the new START Treaty. Formal transmission of the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent is expected in early May. Nevertheless, we are moving forward now to prepare Members of this Committee for action on the new accord and to build a thorough record for the full Senate. Many Members of the Senate are new to the subject of strategic arms control. Only 26 Members of today’s Senate were present in 1992 for debate on the START I Treaty. Only six current Members of the Foreign Relations Committee were Senators when we dealt with the Moscow Treaty in 2003. Senate consideration of the new START Treaty is an opportunity, not only to educate Senators, but also to engage in a broader public dialogue on fundamental questions of U.S. national security and diplomacy.   Texts of the treaty and its protocol are available online, including on my Senate website (http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/). The treaty annexes, which are completed, may soon be publicly released. When they are, they will be placed on my website, as well. I look forward to the Administration’s provision of other key documents in the coming weeks, including a modernization plan for our weapons complex, a National Intelligence Estimate, and a verification assessment.   I support the new START Treaty and believe that it will enhance U.S. national security. It would reduce strategic nuclear launchers and warheads and replace the 1991 START I Treaty that expired last year. Equally important, it will provide forward momentum to our relationship with Moscow, which is vital to U.S. policy goals related to Iran’s nuclear program, nuclear non-proliferation, global energy security, and stability in Eurasia. Further, because the verification procedures contained in START I expired last December, without the new START Treaty, the United States lacks both the ability to carry out onsite inspections in Russia and the formal consultation mechanisms that monitor the Russian strategic nuclear program. It is essential that a verification system be in place so that we have a sufficient understanding of Russian nuclear forces and achieve a level of transparency that prevents miscalculations.    As our hearing today underscores, the task of evaluating a treaty requires more than a reading of the text. The Administration must explain in detail how the treaty fits into our defense plans and how it will affect our relationships with Russia and other nations. Several issues are particularly important to address.   First, some Members have expressed concern about provisions in the new START Treaty that deal with missile defense. START I acknowledged a link between strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems. The preamble to the new Start Treaty similarly acknowledges this link. But new START also contains limits on the deployment of U.S. interceptor missiles in existing strategic missile launchers. The Administration must elaborate on how these provisions constitute no constraint on our missile defense plans, as it claims.    Second, the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review defines a new, more limited role for nuclear weapons in our military strategy. It also says that new conventional weapons could replace nuclear weapons for certain missions. In light of the limits on conventional capabilities in new START, the Administration should explain how, and in what specific instances, conventional capability can replace nuclear capability.   Third, any treaty on strategic nuclear forces will be affected by the continued safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration should explain how it plans to ensure that our weapons will perform their missions over the ten-year life of the treaty. The Administration also must clarify an uncertainty over whether the Nuclear Posture Review’s new, restrictive procedures for maintaining our nuclear stockpile will allow experts sufficient flexibility to keep our weapons safe, secure, and reliable.    Fourth, the Administration should articulate clearly how it wants both American and Russian strategic forces to look at the end of the new treaty’s lifetime. A major goal of the START I and II treaties was to move Soviet and then Russian strategic systems away from destabilizing heavy, fixed ICBMs with many warheads on them. Today, we have largely achieved this goal. What are our goals for the future under the new START Treaty?   These are all important questions for our inquiry, but they are not partisan ones. Arms control treaties have traditionally enjoyed bipartisan backing. With 67 votes required for ratification, the Senate approved the START I Treaty in 1992 by a vote of 93-6, and the 1996 START II Treaty by a vote of 87-4. The Moscow Treaty, signed by President Bush and then-President Putin in 2003, was approved 95-0. Since the new START Treaty combines concepts from START I and the Moscow Treaty, I believe a thorough and detailed debate can achieve similar levels of support.   We start on this project today. I appreciate the Chairman’s scheduling of this hearing and the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with our esteemed witnesses.   ###