Committee Statement of Senator Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on the New START Treaty Thursday, June 24, 2010 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Dick Lugar made the following statement at today’s hearing.   Today, the Foreign Relations Committee meets twice as part of our ongoing examination of the New START Treaty. This morning we will hear testimony regarding treaty inspections and implementation. This afternoon we will examine benefits and risks of the new treaty.   We welcome back Dr. James Miller, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who appeared before us last week. We also welcome back to the Committee Kenneth A. Myers III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Having served for many years as a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee’s professional staff, we are particularly pleased that Ken has rejoined us for today’s hearing.   During discussions of the New START Treaty, many Senators and commentators have underscored the importance of verification and inspections. It is a widely accepted principle of strategic arms control that agreements must be verifiable. Yet few Senators know how we carry out inspections or implement treaty provisions. Who performs inspections for our government? How do inspectors enter Russia, and under what conditions? What are they allowed to see? How do we choose what to inspect? How do we accommodate Russian inspection teams that come to the United States? Successful arms control sometimes depends on seemingly mundane matters such as delineating the privileges and responsibilities of verification teams operating in each other’s countries, as well as the procedures for conducting inspections. Today’s hearing is an opportunity to develop a detailed understanding of the verification process that will be applied to the New START Treaty.   The START I Treaty expired last December. The White House agreed with Moscow to continue to act in its spirit while negotiations continued on the treaty that is before us. Yet, today, we have no binding verification regime in place with Russia. The only way forward to binding verification is through the New START Treaty.   The Defense Threat Reduction Agency or DTRA was the executive agent for on-site inspection under the START I treaty. The painstaking inspection process in the New START Treaty will also fall within DTRA’s purview. Beyond treaty inspections, DTRA has numerous missions, including implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which is devoted to safely converting and destroying vast stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union.   As of today, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,545 strategic nuclear warheads, as well as corresponding strategic launchers and nuclear infrastructure. The number of nuclear warheads deactivated in the former Soviet Union under the Nunn-Lugar program is almost five times greater than the number of deployed strategic warheads that Russia would be allowed under the New START Treaty. Nunn-Lugar also has upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites, built and equipped 20 biological monitoring stations, and neutralized 1,395 metric tons of Russian and Albanian chemical weapons agent.   In addition to verification issues, we have the opportunity today to examine the New START Treaty’s implications for the Nunn-Lugar program’s activities in Russia. What missiles or supporting infrastructure are likely to be eliminated under the Treaty? How will the treaty’s revised elimination regime change the locations at which Nunn-Lugar would work?   I have traveled to the former Soviet Union on numerous occasions to encourage and witness the safeguarding and destruction of weapons covered by START and other initiatives. The destruction of thousands of weapons is a monumental achievement for our countries, but the process surrounding this joint effort is as important as the numbers of weapons eliminated. The U.S.-Russian relationship has been through numerous highs and lows in the post-Cold War era. Throughout this period, START inspections and consultations and the corresponding threat reduction activities of the Nunn-Lugar program have been a constant that have served to reduce miscalculation and build respect. This has not prevented highly contentious disagreements with Moscow. But it has meant that we have not had to wonder about the make-up and disposition of Russian nuclear forces during periods of tension. It also has reduced, though not eliminated, the proliferation threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.   This process must continue if we are to answer the existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated, and every inspection implemented makes us safer. Russia and the United States have the choice whether or not to continue this effort, and that choice is embodied in the New START Treaty.   I thank the witnesses for joining us today and look forward to their insights.   ###