Committee Statement of Senator Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on the New START Treaty Thursday, June 24, 2010 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Dick Lugar made the following statement at today’s hearing.   This morning, the Committee met with Dr. James Miller, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Kenneth A. Myers, III, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to better understand how the New START Treaty will be implemented. We examined, in particular, how inspections will be carried out and how the Nunn-Lugar Program will intersect with the New START Treaty.   This afternoon, we continue our discussion with an examination of the potential risks and benefits of the Treaty. We welcome Bob Joseph, who was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security during the second Bush Administration; Eric Edelman, who has served several Administrations in different capacities, including the Bush Administration as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and Morton Halperin, currently of the Open Society Institute, who also was a member of the 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.   Most of the basic strategic concerns that motivated Republican and Democratic Administrations to pursue nuclear arms control with Moscow during the last several decades still exist today. We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and reduce the costs of maintaining the weapons. We are pursuing transparency of our nuclear arsenals, backed up by strong verification measures and formal consultation methods. We are attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and encourage global cooperation toward non-proliferation goals. And we are hoping to solidify U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security matters, while sustaining our knowledge of Russian nuclear capabilities and intentions.   We know, however, that bilateral treaties are not neat instruments, because they involve merging the will of two nations with distinct and often conflicting interests. Treaties come with inherent imperfections and questions. As Secretary Gates testified in May, even successful agreements routinely are accompanied by differences of opinion by the parties. The ratification process, therefore, is intended to consider whether limits on strategic forces and verification procedures are fully consistent with U.S. national security.   This process also is intended to prepare the Committee to draft a resolution of ratification for consideration by the whole Senate. The resolution should clarify the meaning and effect of treaty provisions for the United States and resolve areas of concern or ambiguity.   We appreciate the assistance of our witnesses today in this continuing process and look forward to their testimony.   ###