A Nuclear Fuel Bank Advocated
By Senators Richard G. Lugar and Evan Bayh
As submitted to the Chicago Tribune
October 22, 2006

While the full ramifications of North Korea's actions remain unclear, one thing is certain: the international community's efforts have failed to prevent countries from developing nuclear weapons, and we must act now to prevent a world of multiplying nuclear-armed countries and perhaps nuclear-armed terrorists.

For too long, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been improperly exploited. States are allowed to walk up to the threshold of a nuclear bomb legally and openly. If a state agrees to foreswear nuclear weapons, the NPT has been wrongly interpreted to say it may acquire nuclear technology and fuel, including enrichment facilities.

From there, all it takes is a country's decision to leave the NPT and, with minimal know-how, become a nuclear weapons state complete with a steady supply of bomb-grade uranium and plutonium. This is how North Korea got the bomb in the first place, and it's how Iran is seeking to do so as well.

We need a new international non-proliferation standard that prevents countries from using the guise of nuclear energy to develop nuclear weapons. By allowing countries to come so close to the line—legally--we put ourselves in the position of being unable to stop a true threat until it is too late.

The time has come and the dangers are so great that the world community must declare that there is no NPT right to enrich uranium or separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. No new country should be able to pursue uranium enrichment or plutonium separation even if claiming to do so for civil nuclear energy purposes.

Unfortunately, this change appears to be too late to prevent a nuclear North Korea. But the opportunity remains to stop countries such as Iran who may take a similar tack.

Unless the international community, led by the United States, takes this important step, the coming surge in demand for nuclear power will lead more and more nations to seek their own enrichment facilities. We understand that making the case for this change will be difficult, but we believe it is necessary given the continued failures of the current approach.

Some countries will complain that in opposing new enrichment and reprocessing facilities, the United States is breaking the basic bargain of the NPT, which offers assistance on peaceful nuclear programs to countries that agree not to build nuclear bombs. Instead, for countries that renounce their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, we would offer guaranteed access to nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable prices, consistent with the NPT's true intent.

To assure steady nuclear reactor fuel supplies and services, we propose the establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Bank, controlled by the IAEA. Countries would be able to draw fuel for their power plants, provided they agree to strict verification and inspections, and then return the spent fuel for safe oversight by the IAEA. This proposal will ensure access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and prevent weapons proliferation, consistent with the NPT's true intent.

Equally importantly, the creation of the Nuclear Fuel Bank cuts short the debate over nuclear technology rights. It will draw a clear line in the sand: with no legitimate need for enrichment facilities, economic or otherwise, countries that refuse Nuclear Fuel Bank services will come under immediate suspicion about their weapons intentions.

Think tanks and private groups, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, headed by former Senator Sam Nunn, have supported this idea. In fact, President Bush announced a similar initiative two years ago, but since then the issue has been given little attention. The diplomatic challenges to achieving this goal are daunting, but so are the dangers if we fail to do so. It is time to try a new approach to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, before the North Korean test is echoed by another in Iran.