

9/14/10  
4:45 pm

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—111th Cong., 2d Sess.**

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT In the Nature of a Substitute intended to be  
proposed by Mr. LUGAR

Viz:

1       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the fol-  
2       lowing: "That—  
3       (a) ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE TO RATI-  
4       FICATION.—The Senate advises and consents to the ratifi-  
5       cation of the Treaty between the United States of America  
6       and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further  
7       Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,  
8       signed in Prague April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including  
9       Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on  
10       Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric In-  
11       formation to the Protocol, all such documents being inte-  
12       gral parts of and collectively referred to in this resolution

1 as the “New START Treaty” (Treaty Document 111–5),  
2 subject to the conditions of subsection (b), the under-  
3 standings of subsection (c), and the declarations of sub-  
4 section (d).

5 (b) CONDITIONS.—The advice and consent of the  
6 Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty is  
7 subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding  
8 upon the President:

9 (1) GENERAL COMPLIANCE.—If the President  
10 determines that the Russian Federation is acting or  
11 has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the  
12 object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or  
13 is in violation of the New START Treaty, so as to  
14 threaten the national security interests of the United  
15 States, then the President shall—

16 (A) consult with the Senate regarding the  
17 implications of such actions for the viability of  
18 the New START Treaty and for the national  
19 security interests of the United States;

20 (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with  
21 the Russian Federation at the highest diplo-  
22 matic level with the objective of bringing the  
23 Russian Federation into full compliance with its  
24 obligations under the New START Treaty; and

1 (C) submit a report to the Senate promptly  
2 thereafter, detailing—

3 (i) whether adherence to the New  
4 START Treaty remains in the national se-  
5 curity interests of the United States; and

6 (ii) how the United States will redress  
7 the impact of Russian actions on the na-  
8 tional security interests of the United  
9 States.

10 (2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS AND RE-  
11 PORTS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.—(A) Prior  
12 to the entry into force of the New START Treaty,  
13 and annually thereafter, the President shall certify  
14 to the Senate that United States National Technical  
15 Means, in conjunction with the verification activities  
16 provided for in the New START Treaty, are suffi-  
17 cient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian com-  
18 pliance with the provisions of the New START  
19 Treaty and timely warning of any Russian prepara-  
20 tion to break out of the limits in Article II of the  
21 New START Treaty. Following submission of the  
22 first such certification, each subsequent certification  
23 shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate indi-  
24 cating how United States National Technical Means,  
25 including collection, processing, and analytic re-

1 sources, will be utilized to ensure effective moni-  
2 toring. The first such report shall include a long-  
3 term plan for the maintenance of New START  
4 Treaty monitoring. Each subsequent report shall in-  
5 clude an update of the long-term plan. Each such re-  
6 port may be submitted in either classified or unclas-  
7 sified form.

8 (B) It is the sense of the Senate that moni-  
9 toring Russian Federation compliance with the New  
10 START Treaty is a high priority and that the in-  
11 ability to do so would constitute a threat to United  
12 States national security interests.

13 (3) REDUCTIONS.—(A) The New START Trea-  
14 ty shall not enter into force until instruments of  
15 ratification have been exchanged in accordance with  
16 Article XIV of the Treaty.

17 (B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New  
18 START Treaty, the President plans to implement  
19 reductions of United States strategic nuclear forces  
20 below those currently planned and consistent with  
21 the Treaty Between the United States of America  
22 and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive  
23 Reductions, signed at Moscow May 24, 2002 (com-  
24 monly referred to as “the Moscow Treaty”), then  
25 the President shall—

1           (i) consult with the Senate regarding the  
2           effect of such reductions on the national secu-  
3           rity of the United States; and

4           (ii) take no such reductions until the Presi-  
5           dent submits to the Senate the President's de-  
6           termination that such reductions are in the na-  
7           tional security interest of the United States.

8           (4) **TIMELY WARNING OF BREAKOUT.**—If the  
9           President determines, after consultation with the Di-  
10          rector of National Intelligence, that the Russian  
11          Federation intends to break out of the limits in Arti-  
12          cle II of the New START Treaty, the President  
13          shall immediately inform the Committees on Foreign  
14          Relations and Armed Services of the Senate, with a  
15          view to determining whether circumstances exist  
16          that jeopardize the supreme interests of the United  
17          States, such that withdrawal from the New START  
18          Treaty may be warranted pursuant to paragraph 3  
19          of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.

20          (5) **UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE TEST**  
21          **TELEMETRY.**—Prior to entry into force of the New  
22          START Treaty, the President shall certify to the  
23          Senate that the New START Treaty does not re-  
24          quire, at any point during which it will be in force,  
25          the United States to provide to the Russian Federa-

1       tion telemetric information under Article IX of the  
2       New START Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol,  
3       and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the  
4       Protocol for the launch of—

5               (A) any missile defense interceptor, as de-  
6       fined in paragraph 44 of Part One of the Pro-  
7       tocol to the New START Treaty;

8               (B) any satellite launches, missile defense  
9       sensor targets, and missile defense intercept  
10      targets, the launch of which uses the first stage  
11      of an existing type of United States ICBM or  
12      SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of  
13      the New START Treaty; or

14              (C) any missile described in clause (a) of  
15      paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START  
16      Treaty.

17      (6) CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE.—

18      (A) The Senate calls on the Executive branch to  
19      clarify its planning and intent in developing future  
20      conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon sys-  
21      tems. To this end, prior to the entry into force of  
22      the New START Treaty, the President shall provide  
23      a report to the Committees on Armed Services and  
24      Foreign Relations of the Senate containing the fol-  
25      lowing:

1 (i) A list of all conventionally armed, stra-  
2 tegic-range weapon systems that are currently  
3 under development.

4 (ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities  
5 of each system listed under clause (i).

6 (iii) A statement with respect to each sys-  
7 tem listed under clause (i) as to whether any of  
8 the limits in Article II of the New START  
9 Treaty apply to such system.

10 (iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and  
11 benefits of each system.

12 (v) A discussion of alternative deployment  
13 options and scenarios for each system.

14 (vi) A summary of the measures that could  
15 help to distinguish each system listed under  
16 clause (i) from nuclear systems and reduce the  
17 risks of misinterpretation and of a resulting  
18 claim that such systems might alter strategic  
19 stability.

20 (B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be  
21 supplemented by a classified annex.

22 (C) If, at any time after the New START Trea-  
23 ty enters into force, the President determines that  
24 deployment of conventional warheads on ICBMs or  
25 SLBMs is required at levels that cannot be accom-

1 modated within the limits in Article II of the Treaty  
2 while sustaining a robust United States nuclear  
3 triad, then the President shall immediately consult  
4 with the Senate regarding the reasons for such de-  
5 termination.

6 (7) UNITED STATES TELEMETRIC INFORMA-  
7 TION.—In implementing Article IX of the Treaty,  
8 Part Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Tele-  
9 metric Information to the Protocol, prior to agreeing  
10 to provide to the Russian Federation any amount of  
11 telemetric information on a United States test  
12 launch of a conventionally armed prompt global  
13 strike system, the President shall certify to the Com-  
14 mittees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of  
15 the Senate that—

16 (A) the provision of United States tele-  
17 metric information—

18 (i) consists of data that demonstrate  
19 that such system is not subject to the lim-  
20 its in Article II of the New START Trea-  
21 ty; or

22 (ii) would be provided in exchange for  
23 significant telemetric information regard-  
24 ing a weapon system not listed in para-  
25 graph 8 of Article III of the New START

1 Treaty, or a system not deployed by the  
2 Russian Federation prior to December 5,  
3 2009;

4 (B) it is in the national security interest of  
5 the United States to provide such telemetric in-  
6 formation; and

7 (C) provision of such telemetric informa-  
8 tion will not undermine the effectiveness of such  
9 system.

10 (8) BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.—

11 Not later than 15 days before any meeting of the  
12 Bilateral Consultative Commission to consider a pro-  
13 posal for additional measures to improve the viabil-  
14 ity or effectiveness of the New START Treaty or to  
15 resolve a question related to the applicability of pro-  
16 visions of the New START Treaty to a new kind of  
17 strategic offensive arm, the President shall consult  
18 with the Chairman and ranking minority member of  
19 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate  
20 with regard to whether the proposal, if adopted,  
21 would constitute an amendment to the Treaty re-  
22 quiring the advice and consent of the Senate, as set  
23 forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Con-  
24 stitution of the United States.

1           (9) UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS ENSURING  
2 THE SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND PERFORMANCE OF  
3 ITS NUCLEAR FORCES.—

4           (A) The United States is committed to en-  
5 suring the safety, reliability, and performance  
6 of its nuclear forces. It is the sense of the Sen-  
7 ate that—

8           (i) the United States is committed to  
9 proceeding with a robust stockpile steward-  
10 ship program, and to maintaining and  
11 modernizing the nuclear weapons produc-  
12 tion capabilities and capacities, that will  
13 ensure the safety, reliability, and perform-  
14 ance of the United States nuclear arsenal  
15 at the New START Treaty levels and meet  
16 requirements for hedging against possible  
17 international developments or technical  
18 problems, in conformance with United  
19 States policies and to underpin deterrence;

20           (ii) to that end, the United States is  
21 committed to maintaining United States  
22 nuclear weapons laboratories and pre-  
23 serving the core nuclear weapons com-  
24 petencies therein; and

1 (iii) the United States is committed to  
2 providing the resources needed to achieve  
3 these objectives, at a minimum at the lev-  
4 els set forth in the President's 10-year  
5 plan provided to the Congress pursuant to  
6 section 1251 of the National Defense Au-  
7 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub-  
8 lic Law 111-84).

9 (B) If appropriations are enacted that fail  
10 to meet the resource requirements set forth in  
11 the President's 10-year plan, or if at any time  
12 more resources are required than estimated in  
13 the President's 10-year plan, the President  
14 shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of  
15 such enactment or the identification of the re-  
16 quirement for such additional resources, as ap-  
17 propriate, a report detailing—

18 (i) how the President proposes to rem-  
19 edy the resource shortfall;

20 (ii) if additional resources are re-  
21 quired, the proposed level of funding re-  
22 quired and an identification of the stock-  
23 pile work, campaign, facility, site, asset,  
24 program, operation, activity, construction,

1 or project for which additional funds are  
2 required;

3 (iii) the impact of the resource short-  
4 fall on the safety, reliability, and perform-  
5 ance of United States nuclear forces; and

6 (iv) whether and why, in the changed  
7 circumstances brought about by the re-  
8 source shortfall, it remains in the national  
9 interest of the United States to remain a  
10 Party to the New START Treaty.

11 (10) ANNUAL REPORT.—As full and faithful  
12 implementation is key to realizing the benefits of the  
13 New START Treaty, the President shall submit a  
14 report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and  
15 Armed Services of the Senate not later than Janu-  
16 ary 31 of each year beginning with January 31,  
17 2012, which will provide—

18 (A) details on each Party's reductions in  
19 strategic offensive arms between the date the  
20 New START Treaty entered into force and De-  
21 cember 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports,  
22 during the previous year;

23 (B) a certification that the Russian Fed-  
24 eration is in compliance with the terms of the

1           New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of  
2           any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;

3           (C) a certification that any conversion and  
4           elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Ar-  
5           ticle VI of the Treaty and Part Three of the  
6           Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that  
7           could defeat the object and purpose of the  
8           Treaty, or—

9           (i) a list of any cases in which a con-  
10          version or elimination procedure that has  
11          been demonstrated by Russia within the  
12          framework of the Bilateral Consultative  
13          Commission remains ambiguous or does  
14          not achieve the goals set forth in para-  
15          graph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of  
16          the Protocol; and

17          (ii) a comprehensive explanation of  
18          steps the United States has taken with re-  
19          spect to each such case;

20          (D) an assessment of the operation of the  
21          New START Treaty's transparency mecha-  
22          nisms, including—

23          (i) the extent to which either Party  
24          encrypted or otherwise impeded the collec-  
25          tion of telemetric information; and

1                   (ii) the extent and usefulness of ex-  
2                   changes of telemetric information; and

3                   (E) an assessment of whether a strategic  
4                   imbalance exists that endangers the national se-  
5                   curity interests of the United States.

6           (c) UNDERSTANDINGS.—The advice and consent of  
7 the Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty  
8 is subject to the following understandings, which shall be  
9 included in the instrument of ratification:

10           (1) MISSILE DEFENSE.—It is the under-  
11           standing of the United States that—

12                   (A) the New START Treaty does not im-  
13                   pose any limitations on the deployment of mis-  
14                   sile defenses other than the requirements of  
15                   paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START  
16                   Treaty, which states, “Each Party shall not  
17                   convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and  
18                   SLBM launchers for placement of missile de-  
19                   fense interceptors therein. Each Party further  
20                   shall not convert and shall not use launchers of  
21                   missile defense interceptors for placement of  
22                   ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision  
23                   shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were  
24                   converted prior to signature of this Treaty for

1 placement of missile defense interceptors there-  
2 in.”;

3 (B) any additional New START Treaty  
4 limitations on the deployment of missile de-  
5 fenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3  
6 of Article V, including any limitations agreed  
7 under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative  
8 Commission, would require an amendment to  
9 the New START Treaty which may enter into  
10 force for the United States only with the advice  
11 and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Arti-  
12 cle II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of  
13 the United States; and

14 (C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement  
15 by the Russian Federation on missile defense  
16 does not impose a legal obligation on the  
17 United States.

18 (2) RAIL-MOBILE ICBMS.—It is the under-  
19 standing of the United States that—

20 (A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic mis-  
21 sile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers  
22 would be an ICBM, as the term is defined in  
23 paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in  
24 the English-language numbering), for the pur-  
25 poses of the New START Treaty, specifically

1 including the limits in Article II of the New  
2 START Treaty;

3 (B) an erector-launcher mechanism for  
4 launching an ICBM and the railcar or flatcar  
5 on which it is mounted would be an ICBM  
6 launcher, as the term is defined in paragraph  
7 28 of Part One of the Protocol (in the English-  
8 language numbering), for the purposes of the  
9 Treaty, specifically including the limits in Arti-  
10 cle II of the New START Treaty;

11 (C) if either Party should produce a rail-  
12 mobile ICBM system, the Bilateral Consultative  
13 Commission would address the application of  
14 other parts of the New START Treaty to that  
15 system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and  
16 XI of the New START Treaty and relevant  
17 portions of the Protocol and the Annexes to the  
18 Protocol; and

19 (D) an agreement reached pursuant to  
20 subparagraph (C) is subject to the requirements  
21 of Article XV of the New START Treaty and,  
22 specifically, if an agreement pursuant to sub-  
23 paragraph (C) creates substantive rights or ob-  
24 ligations that differ significantly from those in  
25 the New START Treaty regarding a "mobile

1 launcher of ICBMs” as defined in Part One of  
2 the Protocol to the New START Treaty, such  
3 agreement will be considered an amendment to  
4 the New START Treaty pursuant to Paragraph  
5 1 of Article XV of the New START Treaty and  
6 will be submitted to the Senate for its advice  
7 and consent to ratification.

8 (3) STRATEGIC-RANGE, NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON  
9 SYSTEMS.—It is the understanding of the United  
10 States that—

11 (A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear  
12 weapon systems that do not otherwise meet the  
13 definitions of the New START Treaty will not  
14 be “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” sub-  
15 ject to the New START Treaty;

16 (B) nothing in the New START Treaty re-  
17 stricts United States research, development,  
18 testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-  
19 nuclear weapons, including any weapon that is  
20 capable of boosted aerodynamic flight;

21 (C) nothing in the New START Treaty  
22 prohibits deployments of strategic-range non-  
23 nuclear weapon systems; and

24 (D) the addition to the New START Trea-  
25 ty of—

1 (i) any limitations on United States  
2 research, development, testing, and evalua-  
3 tion of strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon  
4 systems, including any weapon that is ca-  
5 pable of boosted aerodynamic flight; or

6 (ii) any prohibition on the deployment  
7 of such systems, including any such limita-  
8 tions or prohibitions agreed under the aus-  
9 pices of the Bilateral Consultative Commis-  
10 sion,

11 would require an amendment to the New  
12 START Treaty which may enter into force for  
13 the United States only with the advice and con-  
14 sent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II,  
15 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the  
16 United States.

17 (d) DECLARATIONS.—The advice and consent of the  
18 Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty is  
19 subject to the following declarations, which express the in-  
20 tent of the Senate:

21 (1) MISSILE DEFENSE.—(A) It is the sense of  
22 the Senate that—

23 (i) pursuant to the National Missile De-  
24 fense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106–38), it is  
25 the policy of the United States “to deploy as

1           soon as is technologically possible an effective  
2           National Missile Defense system capable of de-  
3           fending the territory of the United States  
4           against limited ballistic missile attack (whether  
5           accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)”;

6           (ii) defenses against ballistic missiles are  
7           essential for new deterrent strategies and for  
8           new strategies should deterrence fail; and

9           (iii) further limitations on the missile de-  
10          fense capabilities of the United States are not  
11          in the national security interest of the United  
12          States.

13          (B) The New START Treaty and the April 7,  
14          2010, unilateral statement of the Russian Federa-  
15          tion on missile defense do not limit in any way, and  
16          shall not be interpreted as limiting, activities that  
17          the United States Government currently plans or  
18          that might be required over the duration of the New  
19          START Treaty to protect the United States pursu-  
20          ant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or  
21          to protect United States Armed Forces and United  
22          States allies from limited ballistic missile attack, in-  
23          cluding further planned enhancements to the  
24          Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and all

1 phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile  
2 defense in Europe.

3 (C) Given its concern about missile defense  
4 issues, the Senate expects the Executive branch to  
5 offer regular briefings, not less than twice each year,  
6 to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed  
7 Services of the Senate on all missile defense issues  
8 related to the New START Treaty and on the  
9 progress of United States-Russia dialogue and co-  
10 operation regarding missile defense.

11 (2) CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, STRATEGIC-  
12 RANGE WEAPON SYSTEMS.—Consistent with state-  
13 ments made by the United States that such systems  
14 are not intended to affect strategic stability with re-  
15 spect to the Russian Federation, the Senate finds  
16 that conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon  
17 systems not co-located with nuclear-armed systems  
18 do not affect strategic stability between the United  
19 States and the Russian Federation.

20 (3) NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT RE-  
21 DUCATION.—It is the sense of the Senate that the  
22 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)  
23 Program has made an invaluable contribution to the  
24 security and elimination of weapons of mass destruc-  
25 tion, including nuclear weapons and materials in

1 Russia and elsewhere, and that the President should  
2 continue the global CTR Program and CTR assist-  
3 ance to Russia, including for the purpose of facili-  
4 tating implementation of the New START Treaty.

5 (4) ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS.—It is the  
6 sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reduc-  
7 tions mandated by the New START Treaty, the  
8 President should regulate reductions in United  
9 States strategic offensive arms so that the number  
10 of accountable strategic offensive arms under the  
11 New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Fed-  
12 eration in no case exceeds the comparable number of  
13 accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by  
14 the United States to such an extent that a strategic  
15 imbalance endangers the national security interests  
16 of the United States.

17 (5) COMPLIANCE.—(A) The New START Trea-  
18 ty will remain in the interests of the United States  
19 only to the extent that the Russian Federation is in  
20 strict compliance with its obligations under the New  
21 START Treaty.

22 (B) Given its concern about compliance issues,  
23 the Senate expects the Executive branch to offer  
24 regular briefings, not less than four times each year,  
25 to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed

1 Services of the Senate on compliance issues related  
2 to the New START Treaty. Such briefings shall in-  
3 clude a description of all United States efforts in  
4 United States-Russian diplomatic channels and bi-  
5 lateral fora to resolve any compliance issues and  
6 shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to,  
7 a description of—

8 (i) any compliance issues the United States  
9 plans to raise with the Russian Federation at  
10 the Bilateral Consultative Commission, in ad-  
11 vance of such meetings; and

12 (ii) any compliance issues raised at the Bi-  
13 lateral Consultative Commission, within thirty  
14 days of such meetings.

15 (6) EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS IN  
16 COUNTRIES OTHER THAN RUSSIA.—It is the sense of  
17 the Senate that if, during the time the New START  
18 Treaty remains in force, the President determines  
19 that there has been an expansion of the strategic ar-  
20 senal of any country not party to the New START  
21 Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of  
22 the United States, then the President should consult  
23 on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine  
24 whether adherence to the New START Treaty re-  
25 mains in the national interest of the United States.

1           (7) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate af-  
2 firms the applicability to all treaties of the constitu-  
3 tionally based principles of treaty interpretation set  
4 forth in condition (1) of the resolution of advice and  
5 consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the  
6 United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
7 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In-  
8 termediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, to-  
9 gether with the related memorandum of under-  
10 standing and protocols (commonly referred to as the  
11 “INF Treaty”), approved by the Senate on May 27,  
12 1988, and condition (8) of the resolution of advice  
13 and consent to the ratification of the Document  
14 Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on  
15 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of No-  
16 vember 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the  
17 “CFE Flank Document”), approved by the Senate  
18 on May 14, 1997.

19           (8) TREATY MODIFICATION OR REINTERPRETA-  
20 TION.—The Senate declares that any agreement or  
21 understanding which in any material way modifies,  
22 amends, or reinterprets United States or Russian  
23 obligations under the New START Treaty, including  
24 the time frame for implementation of the New

1       START Treaty, should be submitted to the Senate  
2       for its advice and consent to ratification.

3           (9) CONSULTATIONS.—Given the continuing in-  
4       terest of the Senate in the New START Treaty and  
5       in strategic offensive reductions to the lowest pos-  
6       sible levels consistent with national security require-  
7       ments and alliance obligations of the United States,  
8       the Senate expects the President to consult with the  
9       Senate prior to taking actions relevant to para-  
10      graphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty.

11          (10) TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—(A) The  
12      Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following  
13      consultation with allies, an agreement with the Rus-  
14      sian Federation that would address the disparity be-  
15      tween the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the  
16      Russian Federation and of the United States and  
17      would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in  
18      a verifiable manner.

19          (B) Recognizing the difficulty the United States  
20      has faced in ascertaining with confidence the num-  
21      ber of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the  
22      Russian Federation and the security of those weap-  
23      ons, the Senate urges the President to engage the  
24      Russian Federation with the objectives of—

1 (i) establishing cooperative measures to  
2 give each Party to the New START Treaty im-  
3 proved confidence regarding the accurate ac-  
4 counting and security of tactical nuclear weap-  
5 ons maintained by the other Party; and

6 (ii) providing United States or other inter-  
7 national assistance to help the Russian Federa-  
8 tion ensure the accurate accounting and secu-  
9 rity of its tactical nuclear weapons.

10 (11) FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUC-  
11 TIONS.—(A) Recognizing the obligation under Arti-  
12 cle VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-  
13 clear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and  
14 Moscow July 1, 1968, “to pursue negotiations in  
15 good faith on effective measures relating to cessation  
16 of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to  
17 nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and  
18 complete disarmament under strict and effective  
19 international control,” and in anticipation of the  
20 ratification and entry into force of the New START  
21 Treaty, the Senate calls upon the other nuclear  
22 weapon states to give careful and early consideration  
23 to corresponding reductions of their own nuclear ar-  
24 senals.

1           (B) The Senate declares that further arms re-  
2           duction agreements obligating the United States to  
3           reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of  
4           the United States in any militarily significant man-  
5           ner may be made only pursuant to the treaty-mak-  
6           ing power of the President as set forth in Article II,  
7           section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United  
8           States.