Below is Sen. Dick Lugar’s prepared floor statement for introduction of the Warner-Lugar Iraq Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill.
Mr. President, I rise to commend the Warner-Lugar amendment to the Senate. I thank my long-time colleague and good friend John Warner for his graciousness and insight during the drafting of this amendment. Senator Warner and I recognize that there is broad disagreement in Congress on what I have called the binary choice between surge and withdrawal. Nevertheless, we also have sensed a palpable desire in this body to achieve greater bipartisanship. We do not claim that our amendment can be the wellspring to restore bipartisanship on the Iraq debate. But we believe that Senators of both parties will find constructive provisions in our amendment and that most Senators of both parties will agree with its intent.
I continue to counsel the President and his administration to move now to construct a more sustainable policy in Iraq that reduces our troop commitments and transitions away from the mission of interposing ourselves between sectarian factions. Although I do not doubt the evaluation of U.S. military leaders in Iraq that there has been military progress, I believe there is strong evidence that the Iraqi government and political system will not achieve necessary political accommodations in a short time frame. I believe that continuing with the surge delays policy changes that have a far better chance of protecting our vital interests in the region over a sustained period.
I am hopeful that my counsel and that of many others who are weighing in with the President will lead to policy changes. But I have no illusions that what the Senate does during the amendment process to this Defense Authorization bill is now likely to affect the President’s decision about his strategy during the next two months. The President has said pointedly that he will not change course in Iraq before hearing the report of General Petraeus in September. Congress’ power to compel change in an existing military operation rests primarily in the authority to deny funds for that operation. But most members do not favor that course in Iraq, which would jeopardize the safety of our troops.
Senator Warner and I have tried to approach the current situation by asking “what should happen now, even if the President does not change course.” As such, our amendment is not an attempt to bring final resolution to the disagreement between advocates of the surge and advocates of withdrawal. Rather, we are attempting to ensure that U.S. military and diplomatic policy is prepared for change when the Petraeus report arrives in September. We are hopeful that regardless of where Senators stand on surge versus withdrawal, they will find our amendment to be a constructive bipartisan attempt to prepare for whatever policy follows in the coming months.
With this goal in mind, our amendment mandates that the Administration immediately initiate planning for post-September contingencies, including a drawdown or re-deployment of forces. It requires those plans to be presented to Congress by October 16 of this year, and it states that the plans should be designed to be executable beginning not later than December 31. The surge must not be an excuse for failing to prepare for the next phase of our involvement in Iraq, whether that is withdrawal, redeployment, or some other option. We saw in 2003 after the initial invasion of Iraq, the disastrous results of failing to plan adequately for contingencies.
To ensure an opportunity to debate the implications of General Petraeus’ report, our amendment declares that the rationale given for the authorization to use force, which passed in 2002, is obsolete and requires revision. Many of the conditions and motivations that existed when we authorized force almost five years ago, no longer exist or are irrelevant to our current situation. Therefore, the amendment states that Congress expects the President to send Congress a new rationale for the authorization at the time of the Petraeus report.
We want to avoid a drift in Iraq policy that continually references the next report or milestone, even as the fundamental conditions of our intervention in Iraq remain extremely problematic and hazardous. A revision of the rationale for the use of force should be the occasion for a more forward looking Congressional debate. Such a debate should go beyond the question of whether we are in or out of Iraq. A revised authorization may require us to consider complex issues that Congress has not yet debated, including the missions of a residual force in Iraq, the re-deployment of units to other countries, and the role of U.S. troops as it relates to the broader Persian Gulf region.
Our amendment also spells out the need for an urgent diplomatic effort in the region to repair alliances, recruit more international participation in Iraq, deal with refugee flows, prevent aggression, generate basing options, and otherwise prepare for future developments. This must proceed, now. If we have not made substantial diplomatic progress by the time a follow-on policy is implemented, our options will be severely constrained and we will be guessing at a viable course in a rapidly evolving environment.
Diplomacy cannot be disassociated from other elements of power, including military force, which is why I believe that the United States requires a troop presence in the region. The military element would allow us to respond to terrorist threats or dangerous contingencies and it would dissuade adventurism. But we must understand the limits and risks of military power far better than we understood them when we invaded Iraq.
The Warner-Lugar amendment advocates a consistent diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve transparency of national interests so that neighboring states and other actors avoid missteps. I believe it would be in the self-interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings, as well as the United States, EU representatives, or other interested parties. Such a forum could facilitate more regular contact with Syria and Iran with less drama and rhetoric. The existence of a predictable and regular forum in the region would be especially important for dealing with refugee problems, regulating borders, exploring development initiatives, and preventing conflict between the Kurds and Turks.
A consistent forum in the Middle East is particularly salient, because that region suffers from conspiracy theories, corruption, and the opaque policies of non-democratic governments. We should be meeting with states on a constant basis and encouraging them to meet with each other as a means of achieving transparency. Transparency is a fundamental concept of good governance and international relations in the West. We should not underestimate the degree to which the lack of transparency in the Middle East intensifies risks of conflict and impedes solutions to regional problems. A constant, predictable diplomatic forum would allow countries and groups to keep an eye on one another. Such a forum would make armed incursions more risky for an aggressor. It would provide a means of applying regional peer pressure against bad behavior. It would also complicate the plans of those who would advance destructive sectarian agendas.
In the best case, the President would initiate such a forum in cooperation with the Iraqi government -- a step that would confer greater legitimacy on that government. But he should proceed regardless. If nations or groups decline to attend or place conditions on their participation, their intransigence will be obvious to the other players in the region. Establishing such a forum will take heavy lifting by the President and the Secretary of State. They must enlist the help of friendly regimes in the region to give the forum diplomatic weight and consistent attendance.
A minimum standard for such a forum would be the Six-Party Talks related to North Korea’s nuclear program. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has done a masterful job of maintaining momentum in the Six-Party Talks despite difficult circumstances. Just as these talks have improved communications in Northeast Asia beyond the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program, stabilizing Iraq could be the occasion for a diplomatic forum that contributes to other Middle East priorities.
Mr. President, regardless of what the Petraeus report says, it is very likely that there will be changes in missions and force levels as the year proceeds. We need to be planning for what comes next. If U.S. military leaders, diplomats, and, indeed, the Congress, are not prepared for these contingencies, they may be executed poorly, especially in an atmosphere in which public demands for troop withdrawals may compel action on a political timetable. In my judgment, military planners and diplomats would welcome congressional validation for their work. Currently, because of the politically charged nature of the debate, diplomacy and military planning are constrained by concerns that either would be perceived as evidence of a lack of confidence in the President’s surge strategy. But even President Bush understands that the current surge will not last forever. We need to lay the groundwork for alternatives, so that as the President and Congress move to a new plan, it can be implemented safely, effectively, and rapidly.
I am hopeful that Senators will support the Warner-Lugar amendment.
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