Following is the prepared text of U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar’s speech at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s roundtable on the future of US-Russia arms control and nuclear energy cooperation:

It is a pleasure to be here today with my treasured partner, Sam Nunn, to discuss the future of US-Russian cooperation in the field of arms control and nonproliferation. I want to thank Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment and the PIR Center for hosting these important roundtable discussions. Rose is a thoughtful friend and long-time contributor to these important discussions. I look forward to our conversation this afternoon on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, especially on the matter of nuclear fuel assurances.

During the last 15 years, the U.S.-Russian relationship has experienced a geopolitical rollercoaster ride. But throughout the highs and lows, both sides have understood that our work confronting the dangers of weapons of mass destruction is too important to be sidelined. We have worked together to implement nuclear and chemical arms control treaties. Our two countries cooperated closely in the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we have dismantled more than 2,000 intercontinental missiles; eliminated 1,000 missile launchers; and deactivated 7,000 nuclear warheads. In addition, our experts have worked together to remove nuclear material from vulnerable locations around the world and to secure it in Russia.

Senator Nunn and I are here in Moscow, at the invitation of the Russian Government, to celebrate our bilateral cooperation in addressing in a cooperative manner common threats to our security. The US and Russia have successfully moved beyond an era in which the relationship was marked by threats to an era in which cooperation is the norm. While we have much to be proud of, we should not think of this anniversary as only a time of mutual congratulation. Rather, it should be a time to highlight the new steps that must be taken to consolidate the gains we have made and to launch initiatives necessary to meet new proliferation challenges. The U.S.-Russia relationship is critical to the security and prosperity of the international community. Presidents Bush and Putin have the opportunity to give new direction to their bureaucracies and to lead our countries toward a stronger partnership. In so doing, both presidents must recognize the need to construct new nonproliferation policies as well as the utility of traditional arms control mechanisms.

I urge the Presidents to solidify new areas of cooperation on weapons of mass destruction. First, the United States and Russia must extend the START Treaty’s verification and transparency elements, which will expire in 2009; and they should work to add verification measures to the Moscow Treaty.

I am concerned by reports that U.S.-Russian negotiations do not include discussions of a legally binding treaty or the continuation of a formal verification regime. If Moscow and Washington do not change course in this matter, both sides will regret their decision in the years ahead. It is true that the current bilateral relationship is not the same as the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But what is the rationale for abandoning a legally-binding START Treaty? If both sides agree that it is necessary to have some type of verification arrangements in place, why not provide them with the force of law? The predictability and confidence provided by a treaty and an effective verification regime will reduce the chances of misinterpretation, miscalculation, and error. The current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty into the nuclear relationship. Negotiating a legally binding regime is challenging and time-consuming, but it is well worth the effort.

It is also likely that something less than a legally-binding treaty will have a negative effect on the international community’s view of American and Russian commitment to meeting our obligations under Article VI of the NPT. This could lead to a weakening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has already suffered significant damage in recent years. A shift in policies in both capitals will be necessary if we are to stop this sharp decline and begin to rebuild the regime.

I appreciate the view held by many in Washington and Moscow that the Moscow Treaty was a first step in formalizing a new strategic relationship based on transparency and confidence building measures. But we must not forget that this new concept was buttressed by the START Treaty’s verification regime. In other words, the conceptual underpinning of the Moscow Treaty depends upon something which is about to expire. In the United States, the Departments of Defense and State at one time told Congress they recognized the integral role of START in the Moscow Treaty and that START therefore would be improved before it expires in 2009. Congress was also told that efforts would be launched to add verification mechanisms to the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately, the rhetoric of 2002 and 2003 does not match the actions of 2007.

Recently in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Cartwright, the head of Strategic Command, was asked whether the Bush Administration’s decision not to extend the START Treaty would have an impact on a prompt global strike capability. The General replied: “[That decision] will provide greater flexibility to pursue prompt global strike solutions, while simultaneously seeking to preserve appropriate confidence building measures. In the end, we seek new systems that contribute to national security and reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons.” Unfortunately, I believe the failure to extend the START Treaty will have the opposite effect and lead to less not better Russian-American strategic understanding.

I agree with the view that we should revisit Cold War arms control and verification assumptions and mechanisms in light of the current Russian-American strategic relationship. But I am concerned that the “rules of the road” may become overly opaque and ill-defined when legally binding regimes are permitted to dissolve. The selective discarding of START Treaty elements in order to arrive at post-START transparency alternatives carries with it the seeds of greater distrust between the two sides. I am not opposed to new transparency measures but the current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough without introducing greater elements of uncertainty into the nuclear relationship.

The START Treaty is not the only strategic issue on the Russian-American agenda. Senator Nunn and I are here in Moscow to celebrate 15 years of successes for the Nunn-Lugar program. The program succeeded in convincing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to remove all of the nuclear weapons from their territories. In addition, it became the primary tool through which the United States works with Russia to safely destroy its massive nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capacity. Together, the United States and Russia have eliminated more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France and China. Beyond dismantlement, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has provided an operational basis for the expansion of cooperative relations between Russia and the United States. Even during moments of tension between our countries, the Nunn-Lugar program remained a constant. Both sides recognized the importance of this endeavor to our mutual security. It has evolved far beyond just an assistance program. It is a partnership between two nations who share a common vision and commitment to address a common threat. Our shared experiences and record of cooperation have already produced results outside of Russia. The program eliminated a formerly secret chemical weapons stockpile in Albania. Other governments are now quietly inquiring about Nunn-Lugar assistance with dangerous weapons and materials.

I have never considered Nunn-Lugar to be merely a program, or a source of funding, or a set of agreements. Rather, it is a concept through which, we attempt to take control of a global threat of our own making. It is an engine of non-proliferation cooperation and expertise that can be applied to many situations around the world.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the number one national security threat facing our countries and the international community. Our nations continue to lack even minimal confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs. We must pay much more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically destroyed. This is a mission that benefits all nations, but it has particular importance to the United States and Russia.

In a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Senator Nunn and I urged Presidents Bush and Putin to use the Nunn-Lugar Program wherever threats emerge. The United States and Russia should be sending the clear message that we are willing to go anywhere and undertake any conversation in pursuit of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Some may say that we cannot forge cooperative non-proliferation programs with the most worrisome nations. But evidence proves that such pessimism is unwarranted. The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that Americans and Russians would be working together to collect dangerous weapons materials around the world.

The U.S. and Russia should be exploring how the Nunn-Lugar experience can be applied in North Korea. While difficult diplomatic work remains, we must be prepared to move forward quickly if the Six-Party Talks succeed. If negotiations yield an agreement from Pyongyang to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, a Nunn-Lugar program combining Russia and U.S. participation, represents a ready-made framework for beginning the weapons elimination process. The Nunn-Lugar program would have a different orientation in North Korea, but the program has the authority, flexibility, and experience to adapt to the Korean situation. Moscow and Washington have proven that former enemies can work together to achieve shared security benefits. Such a track record will be critical to a successful diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula.

Russia and the United States must also come together to address the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons program. For too long, our governments have been at odds over how to respond to Tehran’s behavior. The differences in our approaches have narrowed recently, and there are prospects for continued cooperation between Moscow and Washington within the UN Security Council. I am hopeful that this renewed collaboration will extend to missile defense, as well.

Current concerns over the impact of a limited, regional missile defense system in central Europe directed at rogue states can evolve into productive discussions over a more global approach to defenses against nuclear attacks. Writing in the August 9, 2007, edition of the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger suggested that President Putin’s initiative to link NATO and Russian warning systems was one of those initiatives easy to disparage on technical grounds but also one that allows us to “imagine a genuinely global approach to the specter of nuclear proliferation, which has until now been treated largely through national policies … If the countries involved link their strategies on the nonproliferation issue – a new framework for a host of other issues will come about”.

I agree with former Secretary Kissinger. Weapons of mass destruction remain the number one national security threat to the United States and to Russia. Strong cooperation in addressing these common threats provides a foundation for broader cooperation. Success in this area would be a critical boost to international security and put the U.S.-Russian relationship on firmer footing that would enhance the prospects of solutions in other areas.

Over the years, I have described international cooperation in addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction as a “window of opportunity.” We never know how long that window will remain open. We must eliminate those items that restrict us or delay our ability to act. Together, the US and Russia, have the expertise, the capabilities, international legitimacy, and the wherewithal to dramatically benefit our joint interests and international security. American and Russian leaders must continue to work closely together to ensure that we have the political will and the resources to implement programs devoted to these ends. Thank you for your attention. I look forward, with you, to an important discussion.