It is a privilege to celebrate with you the tenth anniversary of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I want to thank my friend, Jim Tegnelia, for inviting me to participate in this special occasion.

 

For ten years DTRA has been at the forefront of the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. I have greatly enjoyed working with the dedicated staff of DTRA. We have shared many productive adventures in locations and circumstances that few Americans have ever experienced. From snowy runaways at former Soviet bomber bases to biological weapons labs in Georgia; from the chemical weapon destruction facility in Siberia to submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula; from former nuclear weapons test sites in Kazakhstan to the mountains of Albania - it has been my privilege to support the talented professionals of this agency in reducing threats facing our country. I continue to be impressed by your commitment to the mission and your ingenuity in finding creative solutions to seemingly impossible tasks.

 

Much of this work has been done outside the public eye.  This is not to say that non-proliferation activities have lacked public support. Last week, I was pleased when both Presidential candidates used the occasion of their recent debate to endorse the work of the Nunn-Lugar program. Similarly, Congressional votes have consistently supported funding for Nunn-Lugar and other non-proliferation projects. But your work is a success that few members of Congress or American citizens fully understand and appreciate.

 

During my conversations with Hoosiers and others around the country, I do my best to explain what is happening on the ground in Russia and many other locations. I put out monthly press releases describing exactly how many weapons were destroyed in the previous month. My office displays a large representation of the Nunn-Lugar scorecard and numerous photos and artifacts from my visits to weapon elimination sites. We have produced a video that devotes a long section to documenting the progress of the Nunn-Lugar program. But understandably, threat reduction programs rarely make headlines. We are engaged in an endeavor in which notoriety is likely to come if something goes wrong - if materials or weapons of mass destruction are not contained in some instance. This makes for an exceptionally painstaking standard that must be met day in and day out. I appreciate so much the enthusiasm of everyone in this agency for this rigorous work and your willingness to quietly and efficiently take on such a monumental task.

 

 

In recent weeks, many observers have discussed the future of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Russia’s actions in Georgia were unacceptable and illegal. To date, Moscow still has not complied with its commitment to fully withdraw from Georgian territory.

Despite the downward spiraling of the bilateral relationship, U.S.-Russian cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar Program has remained steady. During August - at the height of the Russian invasion and international denunciations of Russian actions - the Nunn-Lugar Program eliminated ten SS-25 truck-mounted intercontinental ballistic missile systems. As you know, these missiles each carried a nuclear warhead capable of destroying a U.S. city.

 

The United States and Russia have cooperated closely in the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. To date, more than 2,000 intercontinental missiles have been dismantled; 1,000 missile launchers have been eliminated; and more than 7,200 nuclear warheads have been deactivated through bilateral cooperation. Together, the United States and Russia have eliminated more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China. In addition, American and Russian experts have worked together to remove nuclear material from vulnerable locations around the world and to secure it in Russia.

 

Despite these successes, some question why we should continue our work in the wake of Russia’s actions in Georgia. I would remind skeptics that the Nunn-Lugar program was created to safeguard vital U.S. national security interests, and these interests continue to be a priority. We should have no illusions about Russian policies that are designed to intimidate neighbors and leverage energy supplies for geopolitical gain. But we also cannot dismiss vital national security goals that depend on maintaining some type of working relationship with Russia - particularly when weapons of mass destruction are involved.

 

I believe that we should have confidence in our ability to work with the international community to present Russia with clear choices between the advantages of cooperation with the West and the disadvantages of pursuing a contentious course. Since Russia’s military action in Georgia, the Russian economy and stock market have felt the effects of a sharp decline in international investor confidence. Achieving greater unity in Europe on developing alternative supplies of energy that do not depend on Russia would go a long way toward balancing economic relationships and giving Russia greater incentives to engage with the West more broadly, rather than focusing on building an energy monopoly. The next President and his counterparts in Europe must devote themselves fully to this task.

 

In the meantime, we should recognize that the U.S.-Russian arms control and non-proliferation relationship remains critical to the security of the international community. Later this year or early next year, two important non-proliferation milestones will be reached in our cooperation with Russia. First, all of the nuclear warhead storage facilities identified under the Bratislava Agreement will have received safety and security upgrades. DTRA should be proud of the important role it has played in the process. Second, the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye will begin its important work of destroying two million chemical munitions. I am hopeful that these events will serve to remind Russians and Americans of continuing dangers and the necessity of cooperation.

 

 

Beyond Russia, it is vital that the United States breaks new ground in safeguarding and destroying weapons of mass destruction. I have never considered Nunn-Lugar to be merely a program, or a funding source, or a set of agreements. Rather, it is an engine of non-proliferation cooperation and expertise that can be applied around the world. And it is a concept through which, we as leaders who are responsible for the welfare of our children and grandchildren attempt to take control of a global threat.

 

The United States must send the clear message that we are willing to go anywhere to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. New opportunities for partnership must be pursued creatively and relentlessly. Some may say that we cannot forge cooperative non-proliferation programs with the most troublesome nations. But the Nunn-Lugar program has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that Americans and Russians would be working together to collect dangerous weapons and materials around the world.

 

It is time to empower the Nunn-Lugar Program and those of you at DTRA who implement it.   Governments around the world are attempting to deal with dangerous weapons issues. The chemical weapons stockpile in Albania will not be the last that is discovered. Taking the long view, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.

 

The program must have the flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies. The Secretary of Defense must have the authority to operate in difficult political and strategic environments without the risk that critical operations could be suspended because of the unintended consequences of executive or legislative action.

 

Today, the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund at the Department of State is the only U.S. non-proliferation program that operates with so-called "Notwithstanding Authority." This authority allows the Administration to do non-proliferation work in any nation or environment irrespective of U.S. legal obstacles - such as sanctions - that might otherwise block action. While useful, the NDF is not a substitute for a Nunn-Lugar program with Notwithstanding Authority. The NDF ’s budget is only about $30 million, compared to a Nunn-Lugar budget of almost half a billion dollars. The NDF operates with resource, management, and expertise limitations, some of which have been cited by the State Department Inspector General and the General Accounting Office.

 

Granting Nunn-Lugar notwithstanding authority would ensure that Nunn-Lugar would have the ability to respond rapidly to new non-proliferation opportunities. We should not allow bureaucratic inertia to impede potentially historic transformations in North Korea or elsewhere. If negotiations yield an agreement from Pyongyang to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the Nunn-Lugar program represents a ready-made framework for beginning the weapons elimination process.   The Nunn-Lugar program would have a different orientation in North Korea than it does in the former Soviet Union, but the program has the authority, flexibility, and experience to adapt to the Korean situation. 

 

 

Although DTRA is well-prepared to seize opportunities to safeguard and dismantle weapons around the globe, much more attention must be applied by our government to creating these opportunities and establishing a coherent arms control strategy. There is growing concern, both in the United States and abroad, that U.S. non-proliferation and arms control policies have lacked commitment and a unifying consensus. In the short run, action on several steps would improve international confidence in U.S. arms control and non-proliferation leadership.   These steps include jumpstarting talks on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; completing U.S. ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which has been inexplicably stalled; correcting funding shortfalls related to the Chemical Weapons Convention; applying U.S. leadership to refurbishing the IAEA’s decrepit verification capabilities and safeguard system; and reversing U.S. funding cuts to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s monitoring system.

 

It is also essential that the United States and Russia conclude negotiations to ensure that the START Treaty does not expire in December 2009. Allowing the START Treaty’s verification and transparency elements to expire would be a severe blow to our own interests. Last year, I was concerned by reports that U.S.-Russian negotiations did not include discussions of a legally binding treaty or the continuation of a formal verification regime. I am pleased that the Administration has indicated that it will accept a legally-binding regime. 

 

If Moscow and Washington had not changed course in this matter, both sides would have regretted their decision in the years ahead. What could have been the rationale for abandoning a legally-binding START Treaty? If both sides agree that it is necessary to have some type of verification arrangements in place, why not provide them with the force of law? 

 

I appreciate the view held by many in Washington and Moscow that the Moscow Treaty was a first step in formalizing a new arms control relationship based on transparency and confidence building measures. But we must not forget that this new concept was buttressed by the START Treaty’s verification regime. In other words, the conceptual underpinning of the Moscow Treaty depends upon something that is about to expire. The Departments of Defense and State told Congress in 2002 and 2003 that they recognized the integral role of START in the Moscow Treaty and that START therefore would be improved before it expired in 2009. The Administration also committed to try to add verification mechanisms to the Moscow Treaty. The current and future Administrations must act on these promises. 

 

The confidence provided by the START Treaty and its effective verification regime reduce the chances of misinterpretation and error. The current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty.

 

 

Over the years, I have described international cooperation in addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction as a "window of opportunity." We never know how long that window will remain open. We must eliminate those conditions that restrict us or delay our ability to act. The United States has the technical expertise and the diplomatic standing to dramatically benefit international security. American leaders must ensure that we have the political will and the resources to implement programs devoted to these ends.

 

Thank you for your attention and more importantly - thank you for your service to our country and ten years of tenacious and talented commitment to safeguarding the American people. And thank you for producing steady progress toward world peace and safety for all mankind.

 

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