Q. What does the Law of the
Sea Convention do?
A. The Convention
establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the
uses of the world’s oceans, including the airspace
above and the seabed and subsoil below. It carefully
balances the interests of states in controlling activities
off their own coasts and the interests of all states
in protecting the freedom to use the oceans without
undue interference. Among the central issues addressed
by the Convention and Implementing Agreement are navigation
and overflight of the oceans, exploitation and conservation
of ocean resources, protection of the marine environment,
and marine scientific research.
As the world’s preeminent maritime
power, the largest importer and exporter, the leader
in the war on terrorism, and the owner of the largest
Exclusive Economic Zone off our shores, the Convention
is highly beneficial to U.S. interests in advancing
economic order and freedom of navigation on the oceans.
Q. How does the Convention
advance U.S. national interests?
A. The Convention
preserves and solidifies the rights of navigation and
overflight across the world’s oceans on which
our military relies to protect U.S. interests around
the world.
The Convention advances U.S. economic
interests by enshrining the right of the United States
to explore and exploit the vast natural resources of
the oceans out to 200 miles from our coastline, and
of our continental shelf beyond 200 miles, and by protecting
freedom of navigation on the oceans over which more
than 28 percent of all U.S. exports and 48 percent of
all U.S. imports are transported.
The Convention protects the environment
by creating obligations binding on all States to protect
and preserve the marine environment from pollution from
a variety of sources, and by establishing a framework
for further international action to combat pollution.
Becoming party to the Convention also
advances the ability of the United States to play a
leadership role in global oceans issues. As a party
to the Convention, the United States will be a leader
in discussions about international ocean policy. If
we are not a party, we will have far less ability to
protect our maritime interests and advance our perspectives
about ocean policy.
Q. Specifically, how does
the Convention advance U.S. national security?
A. Our armed forces
rely on the ability to navigate freely on, over, and
under the world’s oceans to protect U.S. security
interests worldwide. The Convention enshrines key rights
of navigation and overflight.
Admiral Vern Clerk, the Chief of Naval
Operations, has stated that “the Convention supports
U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism by providing important
stability and codifying navigational freedoms, while
leaving unaffected intelligence collection activities.
Future threats will likely emerge in places and ways
that are not yet known. For these and other as yet unknown
operational challenges, we must be able to take maximum
advantage of the established navigational rights codified
in the Law of the Sea Convention to get us to the fight
rapidly.”
Admiral Michael Mullen, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, testified before the Foreign Relations
Committee that, “We support the Convention because
it protects military mobility by codifying favorable
transit rights in key international straits, archipelagic
waters, and waters adjacent to coastal states where
our forces must be able to navigate freely.”
Mark Esper, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Negotiations Policy, cited the following
as “examples of rights that exist under the Convention
that are critical to military operations”:
The Convention also strengthens the
President’s Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), which aims to impede and stop shipments of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related
materials. As Admiral Mullen told the Foreign Relations
Committee, being party to the Convention “would
greatly strengthen [the Navy’s] ability to support
the objectives” of PSI by reinforcing and codifying
freedom of navigation rights on which the Navy depends
for operational mobility. In a similar vein, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Esper observed that “as a
party to the Law of the Sea Convention, the United States
will have another avenue through which to achieve consensus
proscribing the maritime trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials
to and from states of concern and terrorists.”
Q. Why does the United States
need to accede to the Convention now? What is the urgency?
A. The Convention
comes open for amendment for the first time in November
of this year. If the United States is not party to the
Convention at that time, we will not have a seat at
the table to protect against proposed amendments to
the Convention that would roll back Convention rights
we fought hard to achieve, including the navigation
and overflight rights on which our Armed Forces rely
to protect U.S. security interests worldwide.
In addition, the Convention’s
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will
soon begin making decisions on claims to continental
shelf areas that could impact the United States’
own claims to the area and resources of its broad continental
margin. Russia is already making excessive claims in
the Arctic. Unless we are party to the Convention, we
will not be able to fully protect our national interest
in these discussions.
Q. Does the Bush Administration
support the Law of the Sea Convention?
A. Yes. The Bush Administration
strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention. The Law of the Sea was one of only five
treaties that the Administration placed in its “urgent”
category on their most recent Treaty Priority List.
Representatives from the Department of State, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Navy, and the
U.S. Coast Guard testified in support of the Convention
at hearings in October before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. The Administration helped write the resolution
of advice and consent accompanying the treaty. Representatives
of the State Department, the Office of Secretary of
Defense, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Justice Department,
the Commerce Department, and the EPA participated in
this interagency drafting process.
Q. Do industries that depend
on the oceans support the Law of the Sea Convention?
A. Yes. Every major
ocean industry, including shipping, fishing, oil and
natural gas, drilling contractors, ship builders, and
telecommunications companies that use underwater cables,
support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea. This includes
the:
American Petroleum Institute
American Chemistry Council
International Association of Drilling Contractors
National Oceans Industries Association
National Marine Manufacturers Association
Chamber of Shipping of America
U.S. Tuna Foundation
Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council
Q. Do environmental, legal,
naval, and research organizations concerned with the
oceans support the Law of the Sea?
A. Yes, the Convention
is supported by the:
Navy League of the United States
Naval Reserve Association
Transportation Institute
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
Pew Oceans Commission
The Ocean Conservancy
Oceana
Center for International Environmental Law
IUCN/World Conservation Union
Natural Resources Defense Council
Scenic America
Environmental Defense
National Environmental Trust
Physicians for Social Responsibility
U.S. Public Interest Research Group
League of Conservation Voters
World Wildlife Fund
Humane Society of the United States
American Bar Association
Maritime Law Association of the United States
Council on Ocean Law
U.S. Arctic Research Commission
Q. What process did the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee follow in considering the
Convention?
A. The SFRC took up
the Convention in 2003 in response to the Bush Administration’s
placement of Law of the Sea in the uppermost “urgent”
category on its most recent Treaty Priority List. The
Committee held two public hearings on the Convention
in October 2003, at which Administration and private
witnesses testified. Between October and February, the
SFRC held four briefings on Law of the Sea for Committee
staff and the staff of all Committee members. Two of
these briefings were headlined by an Administration
interagency team. In February, the Committee met to
vote on the Law of the Sea. The treaty was approved
19-0.
Q. Before the Committee vote,
did the Committee receive negative comments concerning
the treaty?
A. During the more
than two weeks that elapsed between the public notice
of the first hearing on Law of the Sea and the completion
of the second hearing, the Committee received no communications
opposing the treaty or requests to testify against it.
During the four months between the
completion of the second hearing and the Committee vote
to report out the Convention, the Committee received
just one inquiry voicing opposition to the Convention
from an individual representing himself. Staff offered
to receive written testimony from this individual, but
none was sent.
Information about the October hearings
remained on the Committee website throughout this period
and Senator Lugar’s statements on Law of the Sea
were released to the press.
Q. Did President Reagan oppose
the Law of the Sea Convention?
A. President Reagan
accepted all of the Convention’s provisions except
for those dealing with deep seabed mining. He expressed
a series of specific objections to the Convention’s
deep seabed mining provisions. In 1994, an agreement
was concluded that fundamentally restructured the Convention’s
deep seabed mining regime and resolved all of President
Reagan’s stated concerns.
President Reagan stated in 1982 that
“while most provisions of the [then] draft convention
are acceptable and consistent with U.S. interests, some
major elements of the deep seabed mining regime are
not acceptable.” President Reagan’s statement
specified his particular objections to the deep seabed
mining regime, which included lack of adequate U.S.
representation in decision-making about deep seabed
mining, requirements for industrialized states to transfer
to developing states technology related to deep seabed
mining, rules providing for artificial limits on production
of deep seabed minerals, and rules providing for burdensome
regulations and financial costs on private companies
seeking to conduct deep seabed mining. Because of these
concerns, the United States and many other industrialized
declined to become party to the Convention when it was
first concluded in 1982.
In a 1983 proclamation of United States
ocean policy, President Reagan stated that, while the
United States would not become party to the Convention,
the United States accepted and would act in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention relating to the
traditional uses of the oceans, which generally comprise
all of the Convention’s substantive provisions
except for those relating to deep seabed mining. It
has remained U.S. policy since President Reagan’s
1983 statement to act in accordance with these Convention
provisions.
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush initiated further
negotiations to resolve U.S. objections to the deep
seabed mining regime. These talks culminated in a 1994
agreement that comprehensively revised the regime and
resolved each of the problems President Reagan identified
in 1982.
Q. Does the Convention, specifically
Articles 19 and 20, impose new regulations and restrictions
on U.S. intelligence and submarine activities?
A. No, the Convention
does nothing to change the status quo with respect to
U.S. intelligence and submarine activities. The United
States is already party to the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, a predecessor Convention
to the Law of the Sea Convention. Articles 19 and 20
of the Law of the Sea Convention do not expand the rules
with respect to intelligence and submarine activities
beyond those the United States is already subject to
under the comparable provisions of the 1958 Convention.
Indeed, by specifically limiting the
range of activities that may be considered prejudicial
to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
state – something not done in the 1958 Convention
– the Law of the Sea Convention protects the United
States from efforts by other states to regulate other
categories of conduct in the territorial sea.
Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval
Operations, stated in his letter of support for the
Convention that it had no detrimental effect on intelligence
gathering.
Q. Does the Convention prohibit
interdictions of weapons of mass destruction on the
high seas to be undertaken under President Bush's new
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)?
A. No, the Convention
neither prohibits nor inhibits any activities to be
undertaken pursuant to the Proliferation Security Initiative;
in fact the Convention strengthens PSI.
State Department Legal Adviser William
Taft testified before the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee that the rules contained in the Law
of the Sea Convention applicable to boarding and searching
foreign ships at sea are not materially different than
rules in this regard the United States is already subject
to under the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, to which the United States is a party. Acceding
to the Law of the Sea Convention thus will not effect
any change in the legal status quo with respect to PSI.
Moreover, it has been U.S. policy since
President Reagan’s 1983 Statement of Oceans Policy
to act in accordance with the Convention’s provisions
with respect to the traditional uses of the oceans,
which include the Convention’s provisions regarding
the boarding and searching of foreign ships at sea.
The elements of the U.S. Armed Forces carrying out PSI
are thus already operating under the Convention’s
rules, and have been doing so for over 20 years.
Admiral Michael Mullen, Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, testified before the Foreign Relations
Committee that being party to the Convention “would
greatly strengthen [the Navy’s] ability to support
the objectives” of PSI by reinforcing and codifying
freedom of navigation rights on which the Navy depends
for operational mobility. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Negotiations Policy Mark Esper testified
that “as a party to the Law of the Sea Convention,
the United States will have another avenue through which
to achieve consensus proscribing the maritime trafficking
of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials to and from states of concern
and terrorists.”
In addition, PSI’s own rules
require that PSI activities be consistent with the Convention.
The Statement of Interdiction Principles pursuant to
which the PSI operates explicitly states that interdiction
activities under PSI will be undertaken “consistent
with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks” (White House Fact Sheet, September
4, 2003). All of the United States’ partners in
the PSI are parties to the Convention and accordingly
observe its provisions.
Q. Does the Convention give
any decision-making role to the United Nations?
A. No, contrary to
some uninformed claims, the U.N. does not have a decision-making
role related to ANY aspect of the Law of the Sea.
Q. Does the Convention threaten
U.S. sovereignty?
A. No, in fact, the
Convention strengthens and codifies our claims to our
own Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends 200 miles
beyond our shores.
The Convention deals with many issues
in the open ocean beyond this 200 mile zone. The United
States has never claimed sovereignty over the open ocean,
nor have we recognized the claims of other countries
to the open ocean. By definition, these are areas that
lie outside the bounds of national sovereignty. The
only way to establish legal norms in an area where no
sovereignty exists is through international agreement.
Q. If the U.S. does not ratify
the Convention, will it still go into effect?
A. Actually, the Convention
went into effect in 1994 when the 60th nation ratified
it. To date, 145 countries have ratified it. Unlike
some treaties (like the Kyoto Treaty and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty) where U.S. non-participation renders
the treaty irrelevant or inconsequential, the Law of
the Sea will continue to form the basis of maritime
law regardless of whether the U.S. is a party. International
decisions related to national claims on continental
shelves beyond 200 miles from our shore, resource exploitation
in the open ocean, navigation rights, and other matters
will be made in the context of the treaty.
Q. If the U.S. does not ratify
the Convention, can we ignore it?
A. No, unlike treaties
that deal primarily with what happens within the domestic
territory of parties, the United States cannot insulate
itself from the Convention merely by declining to ratify.
There are 145 parties to the Convention, including every
major industrialized country. The Convention is the
accepted standard in international maritime law. Americans
who use the ocean and interact with other nations on
the ocean, including the Navy, shipping interests, and
fisherman, have to contend with provisions of the Law
of the Sea on a daily basis. In practice, they will
have to continue to do so regardless of whether the
United States is a party.
Q. What does the United States
risk if it does not ratify the Convention?
A. In addition, to
forfeiting a leadership role in ocean policy, the United
States’ absence from the Convention increases
the chance that amendments to the Convention will be
adopted that harm U.S. freedom of navigation and economic
interests. The Convention is highly favorable to U.S.
interests as it exists now. Some nations may press for
restrictions on the movement of naval or commercial
vessels near their coastline that would be harmful to
the United States. Others may pursue the right to exclude
nuclear-powered vessels from their territorial waters.
(Under the Convention, a ship’s propulsion system
cannot be used as an argument to restrict its movements.)
As explained above, even if the United States is not
a party to the Convention, it must contend with the
Law of the Sea. As a party, we will be in a very strong
position to prevent harmful amendments.
In addition, the Convention’s
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will
soon begin making decisions on claims to continental
shelf areas that could impact the United States’
own claims to the area and resources of its broad continental
margin. Russia is already making excessive claims in
the Arctic. Unless we are party to the Convention, we
will not be able to fully protect our national interest
in these discussions.
Q. Does the Convention require
the United States to transfer sensitive technology to
other countries or international organizations?
A. No, the Convention
does not require the United States to transfer any technology
to any party.
Elimination of such a requirement was
a key objective of the United States and other industrialized
nations when they renegotiated the Convention’s
deep seabed mining provisions in the 1990s. The Convention’s
mandatory technology transfer provisions were repealed
by Section 5, paragraph 2 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement
Implementing the Convention’s deep seabed mining
provisions.
The Convention as revised contains
only a general undertaking by states to encourage the
promotion of the transfer of technology and scientific
knowledge relating to deep seabed mining. Should developing
states or the International Seabed Authority be unable
to obtain relevant technology on the open market, they
may request assistance in this regard from states parties
to the Convention.
Q. What is the purpose of
the International Seabed Authority created by the Convention?
A. The International
Seabed Authority (ISA) was created to administer deep
seabed mining in areas beyond a nation’s “exclusive
economic zone” (generally areas more than 200
nautical miles from the coastline of any state). The
United States has never claimed sovereign control over
seabed resources beyond its exclusive economic zone.
Similarly, we do not recognize unilateral claims by
other countries to control over such resources.
Most exploitable ocean resources are
located within 200 nm of a coastal state and thus are
unaffected by the ISA. The United States has an exclusive
economic zone of 3.36 million square miles – the
largest exclusive economic zone in the world. This is
an area larger than the area of the lower 48 states.
The Convention recognizes that all the seabed resources
within this area belong to the United States.
At present, mining the seabed in the
deep ocean 200 nautical miles beyond the coast is economically
infeasible. The investment in equipment and technology
costs more than the current value of whatever could
be extracted. Consequently, such mining is not being
conducted.
Someday deep seabed mining under the
open ocean may become profitable from an engineering
standpoint. But no company will make the large investments
required to conduct such mining in waters beyond their
country’s exclusive economic zone unless they
can establish legal title to the sites they wish to
mine. They would not want to risk having their claims
disputed or having competitors free ride off their exploration
investments. Given that no nation has sovereignty beyond
their national jurisdiction, the only way to establish
property rights in the open ocean is through an international
regime.
Establishing that legal title is precisely
what the ISA is designed to make possible. This is one
of the reasons why companies with an interest in deep
seabed mining have supported the treaty.
Q. Does the Convention provide
for production controls on mining of minerals from the
deep seabed?
A. No, the Convention
does not provide for production controls for deep seabed
mineral resources. This was a problem deep seabed mining
provision as originally concluded and was resolved through
the renegotiation of the provision.
The Convention’s production control
provisions were repealed by Section 6 of the Annex to
the 1994 Agreement Implementing the Convention’s
deep seabed mining provisions. The revised rules permit
production without arbitrary limit.
Q. Does the Convention permit
decisions about deep seabed mining to be made by developing
countries over the objection of the United States through
the International Seabed Authority?
A. No, the International
Seabed Authority’s (ISA) rules do not permit the
ISA to be controlled by the Developing World. This was
the subject of the one part of the Convention that the
Reagan Administration asked to be renegotiated in 1983.
The problem was resolved through the renegotiation of
the deep seabed mining regime concluded in 1994.
As revised, the ISA’s rules give
the United States the ability to prevent decisions contrary
to U.S. interests.
If the United States were party to
the Convention, the ISA’s voting rules would allow
the United States to veto the adoption of any rules,
regulations, and procedures relating to the deep seabed
mining regime, decisions having financial or budgetary
implications, decisions relating to distribution of
ISA revenues, and decisions on proposed amendments to
the regime. (Convention Article 161(8)(d); Section 3(7)
of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement Implementing the
Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions).
The United States can veto other decisions
acting together with two other countries that are major
consumers of minerals. (Section 3(5) of the Annex to
the 1994 Agreement Implementing the Convention’s
deep seabed mining provisions).
Q. Does the Convention permit
the International Seabed Authority to exercise direct
global taxing power?
A. No, the ISA has
no authority to levy taxes. The Convention does contemplate
the elaboration of rules for payments of royalties to
the ISA from revenues generated from deep seabed mining.
Under the Convention’s rules, such royalty payments
would be used to cover the ISA’s expenses. (Section
7 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement Implementing the
Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions).
Should any surplus revenues be generated, they could
be used in certain cases to provide economic assistance
to developing countries.
The United States has veto power over
any decisions about distribution of royalty proceeds.
(Convention Article 161(8)(d); Section 3(7) of the Annex
to the 1994 Agreement Implementing the Convention’s
deep seabed mining provisions).
Q. Under the Convention, will
U.S. companies have the opportunity to acquire rights
to conduct deep seabed mining?
A. Yes. In fact, without
the Convention, deep seabed mining will be less likely
to occur. The Convention’s rules provide for awards
of mining rights to be made on first-come, first-served
basis to qualified applicants meeting objective criteria.
(Convention Annex III, Article 6(3)) American companies
will be eligible to apply for such rights on an equal
basis with companies from other countries; Convention
provisions that could have resulted in discrimination
against U.S. companies were repealed by Section 6(7)
of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement Implementing the
Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions). Given
that U.S. companies are among the leaders in seabed
mining technology, our ability to pursue these resources
is more advanced than most.